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I. Introduction
Despite the growing knowledge of and threat posed by climate
change, the aviation industry continues to operate without any
adaptation or mitigation efforts with respect to climate change.
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The public health threats posed by climate change are well
established in the scientific community, as is the certainty that this
threat is caused by green house gas (GHG) l emissions attributable
to humans. While several countries and individual states in the
United States have moved to address the problem,3 the federal
government has not only failed to act, but has intentionally
delayed any possible action, going so far as refusing to open e-
mails from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that state
GHGs represent an endangerment to public health.'
1 For the duration of this article GHGs will refer to carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide and other synthetic gases (hydroflourocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur
hexaflouride).
2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE PLENARY XXVII, Valencia,
Spain, Nov. 12-17, 2007, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: A SYNTHESIS REPORT, AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Report].
"Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and
ice and rising global average sea level." Id. at 30; "Global atmospheric concentrations of
C02, CH4 and N20 have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750
and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many
thousands of years (Figure 2.3). The atmospheric concentrations of C02 and CH4 in
2005 exceed by far the natural range over the last 650,000 years. Global increases in
C02 concentrations are due primarily to fossil fuel use, with land-use change providing
another significant but smaller contribution. It is very likely that the observed increase in
CH4 concentration is predominantly due to agriculture and fossil fuel use. The increase
in N20 concentration is primarily due to agriculture." Id. at 37. See also EPA, Climate
Change Science, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html.
3 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol,
http://unfccc.int/kyotojprotocol/items/2830.php [hereinafter Kyoto]. The Kyoto Protocol
is an international agreement made by thirty-seven industrialized countries to reduce
their GHG emissions. The United States signed the treaty in 1997 but it has yet to be
presented to Congress to be ratified and thus the U.S. is not an Annex B member country
of the protocol. The protocol expires in 2012; there are currently meetings in Warsaw,
Poland, of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and again next
year in Copenhagen, Denmark, that are intended to establish a new agreement for post
Kyoto Climate Change legislation. It remains to be seen if the U.S. will be a party to any
such treaty or agreement. Id. See also PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
WHAT IS BEING DONE IN THE STATES - RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what s beingdone/in the states/rps.cfm (discussing the 27
States that have adopted Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards); see also PEW CENTER
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, A LOOK AT EMISSIONS TARGETS,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what s beingdone/targets (discussing the seventeen States
that have adopted mandatory Carbon Reductions). Critics are split as to the effectiveness
of State climate change mitigation policies. See Kevin Doran, U.S. Sub-Federal Climate
Change Initiatives: An Irrational Means to a Rational End?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 181(2007); but see Robert McKinstry, Remarks at the University of North Carolina Journal
on International Law and Commercial Regulation Symposium: The Greenhouse Gas
Marketplace: Commercial Regulation of Climate Change Solutions - "Integration of
state and regional programs into a national program under the Clean Air Act" (Nov. 15,
2008).
4 0MB WATCH, WHITE HOUSE CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY -- DELAY, DELETE, AND
DENY, http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3741. See also Felicity Barringer, White House
Refused to Open Pollutants E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, available at
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The lack of action by the federal government is troubling given
that the United States accounts for 23% of worldwide carbon
dioxide (C0 2) emissions, the primary GHG contributing to climate
change.' CO 2 represents 84% of GHG emissions in the United
States.6 Thirty-two percent of CO 2 emissions are attributed to the
transportation sector, and 12% of the emissions from the
transportation sector (or 3-4% of total C0 2) are attributable to
aviation.7 The aviation industry is thus a significant contributor of
GHGs in the atmosphere, but it receives relatively little attention
compared to larger emitting industries such as light-duty motor
vehicles or coal burning power plants, which are the source of
19% and 32% of total U.S. emissions, respectively.8 Additionally,
the aviation market is growing; it is estimated that aircraft
emissions will triple by 2050.' Finally, there is some evidence that
emissions released at higher altitudes may have a
disproportionately increased effect on climate change when
compared to emissions at lower altitudes.1"
While aircraft emissions may seem small as a percentage of
total GHG emissions, reductions in all sectors are necessary to
truly address a threat as large as climate change. In November and
December of 2007, states and environmental advocacy
organizations respectively filed two separate petitions demanding
that the EPA regulate the emission of GHGs from aircraft." The
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/washington/25epa.html.
5 Robert R. Nordhaus, New Wine into Old Bottles: The Feasibility of Greenhouse
Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 53, 54-55 (2007).
6 Id. at 54.
7 EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990 - 2005
(Apr. 15, 2007) at 3-9, available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads06/O7CR.pdf [hereinafter EPA
Inventory].
8 Id.
9 SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
172 (Cambridge Univ. Press) (Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/stemreviewreport.htm (follow "Part II: The economics of
stabilization" hyperlink).
10 IAN A. WALTZ, ET AL., AVIATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A NATIONAL VISION
STATEMENT, FRAMEWORK FOR GOALS AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS, REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, at 18 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/partner/reports/congrept aviationenvim.pdf. "It is a fact
that aircraft emit chemical species and produce physical effects (like condensation trails,
or contrails) that most scientists believe affect climate. Scientific assessments also
suggest that the resulting chemical and physical effects due to aviation are such that
aviation may have a disproportionate effect on climate per unit of fuel burned when
compared to terrestrial sources." Id.
II See Petition For Rulemaking Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
2009
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petitions claimed that that the EPA must regulate CO2 and other
GHGs that are emitted from aircraft, a requirement said to derive
from Section 231 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) 2 governing aircraft
emissions regulation. 3 The petitioners claim this argument is
supported by the recent ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA. 14
This article briefly addresses the question of whether or not
these petitions will prevail. The majority of this article analyzes
what measures, if any, Section 231 of the CAA presently
authorizes the EPA to take in regulating GHG emissions from
aircraft. This information will be particularly pertinent should the
Obama Administration take an opposite, more aggressive
approach to climate change regulation than the preceding Bush
Administration.15
This article will look into the scope of the EPA's authority as
described in the statutes, legislative history, promulgated
regulations, and governing case law. Methods of emissions
regulation permitted in the past and the potential authority for
other types of regulations are of particular importance. Part II of
this article will address the petitions filed and the background of
the issue, specifically examining (1) the methods the petitions
desire to implement to regulate GHGs from aircraft; (2) the
reasons the petitions will likely fail; and (3) the technology
available in the production of aircraft engines to reduce emissions.
Emissions from Aircraft at 12-13, State of Cal. (Nov. 6, 2007), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cmsattachments/press/pdfs/n 150 laircraftpetition final.pdf
[hereinafter California] (the petition was filed by California, Connecticut, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, the City of New York, the District of Columbia, and the
South Coast Air Quality Management District); see Petition for Rulemaking Under the
Clean Air Act to Reduce the Emission of Air Pollutants from Aircraft that Contribute to
Global Climate Change at 9-12, Earthjustice et al. (Dec. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.oceana.org/fileadmin/oceana/uploads/ClimateChange/Marine GHG Petitio
n_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Earthjustice] (the petition was filed by Earthjustice, Friends of
the Earth, Oceana, and the Center for Biological Diversity).
12 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (2007) (Section 231 of the CAA is the
governing authority from which EPA derives any power to oversee and regulate
emissions from Aircraft).
13 § 7571 (a)(2).
14 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).
15 See BarackObama.com, New Energy For America, http://my.barackobama.com-
page/content/newenergy (The Obama plan to confront climate change includes a cap and
trade plan to reduce emissions eighty percent by 2050 and a commitment to "re-engage
with the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) - the main
international forum dedicated to addressing the climate problem. They will also create a
Global Energy Forum of the world's largest emitters to focus exclusively on global
energy and environmental issues.") [hereinafter Obama].
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Part III of the article will examine the authority given to the EPA
by Section 231 of the CAA. This analysis will include (1) an
analysis of the text of the CAA itself; (2) a comparison of EPA's
authority to regulate GHG emissions from aircraft with the basis
of the EPA's authority to regulate emissions from mobile sources;
and (3) an analysis of other sections of the CAA which may
weaken the authority of Section 231. Part IV of this article will
address the historical nature of the EPA's authority under the
CAA, looking to the legislative history of the CAA, prior
regulations promulgated under Section 231, Federal Register
listings, and the historical level of deference to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Part V of this article will
examine case law which may provide insight as to the EPA's
authority to regulate GHGs from aircraft as well as examining the
EPA's recent Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR)
regarding the regulation of GHGs. Finally, Part VI will address
international and market-based concerns and inquiries regarding
the regulation of GHGs from aircraft, addressing international
barriers to regulation and if such regulations are necessary at all
given market forces on the industry.
This article concludes that there is more authority given to the
EPA to regulate GHG aircraft emissions through fuel economy
standards enforced during engine production than through
operational fuel conservation standards. In its recent ANPR, the
EPA acknowledged it might have the authority to enforce such
provisions. 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that the
EPA has similar authority to regulate motor vehicles.17 The EPA
relied upon this authority in rejecting California's waiver request
to self-regulate GHG emissions.1 Both of these findings relied on
language in Section 202 that is contained in Section 231 as well.
However, differences also exist in the language of the statutes; the
16 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, Docket No.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0318, (Jul. 11, 2008) at 215, available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads/ANPRPreamble.pdf (reprinted
at 73 Fed. Reg. 44354 (2008)) [hereinafter ANPR].
17 See Mass., 549 U.S. at 533.
18 See Press Release, EPA, America Receives a National Solution for Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/
[hereinafter National Solution] (follow "Newsroom" hyperlink; then follow "News
releases by date" hyperlink; then follow); but see Barack Obama, Memorandum for the
Administrator of the EPA, State of California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C.
7543(b), the Clean Air Act, (Jan. 26, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press-office/PresidentialMemorandumEPAWaiver/.
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differences between the statutory language of Section 202 and
Section 231 may influence what authority the EPA is given to
regulate GHGs from aircraft emissions.
The article's conclusion regarding the EPA's possible
authority to regulate GHG aircraft emissions using fuel economy
standards is strengthened given: (1) the historical trend to conform
aircraft emissions standards to the international standard; and (2)
the decision of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) not to regulate GHG emissions because the primary
methods of doing so are through fuel efficiency standards.19 Given
these reasons, the proposed fuel efficiency regulations installed
during production appear more viable for actual implementation
by the EPA than the conservation-based operational methods
which may be better suited as guidance programs under Section
108 of the CAA.2
°
II. Petitions and Background
A. How the Petitions Request that the EPA Regulate Aircraft
GHG Emissions and Why They Will Not Succeed in
Forcing Implementation
The recently filed petitions by Earthjustice and California
request the imposition of both technology-based fuel efficiency
standards and operational-based fuel conservation efforts as law to
reduce emissions of GHGs from aircraft.2' As discussed below,
neither petition seems likely to succeed in forcing the EPA to
regulate GHG emissions from aircraft. However, laws similar to
those requested in both petitions may very well be established in
some form if the EPA so desires.
The two petitions filed, one by Earthjustice,22 and one by the
State of California, request that the EPA, in light of the recent
Massachusetts v. EPA ruling,23 regulate emissions of GHGs from
19 See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Envtl. Unit, Aircraft Engine
Emissions, http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/aee.htm [hereinafter ICAO].
2o 42 U.S.C. § 7408(0(1)(A). Section 108 of the CAA provides that the EPA can
issue guidelines for fuel conservation strategies for mobile sources.
21 California, supra note 11, at 17-9; Earthjustice, supra note 11, at 8-9.
22 Earthjustice filed the petition on behalf of Oceana, Friends of the Earth, and the
Center for Biological Diversity. Earthjustice, supra note 11, at 2.
23 Mass., 549 U.S. at 534.
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aircraft engines. First, both petitions request that the EPA make a
finding that GHG emissions from aircraft "may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health and welfare., 24  The
Earthjustice petition requests that the EPA issue proposed
standards to regulate these emissions and after such standards are
issued, regulations to achieve the standards be promulgated.2 ' The
Earthjustice petition also suggests technological methods to
regulate GHGs from aircraft engines, including increased fuel
efficiency.26 Further, the Earthjustice petition suggests operational
fuel conservation measures including: minimizing idling times on
runways; employing single engine taxiing; reducing engine thrust
and reverse during takeoff and landing; choosing fuel efficient
routes and reducing stopovers; reducing the use of auxiliary power
units; reducing the amount of excess fuel carried; implementing
continuous descent approaches; and requiring increased
maintenance and cleaning.27
The California petition also requests that the EPA propose and
adopt news standards and regulations. 28 The California petition
makes several similar suggestions for methodology as the
Earthjustice petition. They include technology-based solutions;
implementation of continuous descents; increased landing
operations per hour; reducing the use of auxiliary power units;
single engine taxiing; selection of fuel efficient routes and
reducing the amount of excess fuel carried.29
While these petitions provide an excellent framework for the
available methods that the EPA may want to pursue when
regulating GHG emissions from aircraft, they do not appear likely
to persuade the EPA to do so for three reasons. First, the President
(Executive Branch), on the advice of the Secretary of
Transportation may veto any regulation pertaining to regulation of
aircraft emissions through Section 231 of the CAA for the simple
reason of safety concerns. 30 The President may overturn them on
safety grounds by providing only a "reasonably specific"
24 Earthjustice, supra note 11, at 26.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 8-9.
27 Id. at 10.
28 California, supra note 11, at 13.
29 Id. at 12-3.
30 42 U.S.C. § 7571(c) (2007).
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rationale.3' This standard appears easily met for suggested
operational procedures such as carrying less excess fuel and
adjusting flight patterns to reduce fuel bum.32 For instance, the
need for flexibility in rerouting could be compromised by carrying
less fuel. Second, it is customary for the U.S. to follow
international standards, and the international standards thus far do
not regulate GHG emissions from aircraft.33 Finally, it is unclear
how much authority Section 231 actually gives the EPA to
implement such standards even if an endangerment finding is
made for GHGs and they are listed as criteria pollutants in the
CAA.
The purpose of this article is to examine the last two barriers
discussed above: the authority given to the EPA by the CAA, and
what international and domestic barriers this authority faces.
Assuming that the Administration desires to regulate GHG
emissions from aircraft and therefore would not exercise the
statutorily authorized veto over any proposed regulations, to what
extent does the CAA authorize the EPA to regulate, and what
international and market barriers do they face in light of such
regulation? Before analyzing what authority the EPA has to
implement regulations, it is important to understand the existing
technology capable of reducing GHG emissions from aircraft.
B. The Available Technology to Regulate GHG Emissions
From Aircraft
A brief examination of technology that is either currently
available or possible in the future is useful in looking at what
GHG emissions the EPA should and could regulate. There are
many promising technology-based improvements in the engine
itself, the aircraft design, and fuel efficiency that may significantly
reduce GHG emissions from aircraft in the future. " Pratt and
Whitney, a leading manufacturer of aircraft engines, has
developed a promising Geared Turbofan engine which is said to
increase efficiency, cut CO2 emissions by 1500 tons per year, and
cut NO, emissions in half. This is partially achieved by a 12% -
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See ICAO, supra note 19.
34 49 U.S.C. § 44714 (2007) (The EPA does not have authority to regulate the fuel
itself, this lies in the power of the Federal Aviation Administration).
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15% reduction in fuel bum compared to today's average engines.35
The Geared Turbofan engine is expected to be in regular use in
planes manufactured by Mitsubishi and Bombardier by 2013.36
Pratt and Whitney also have other fuel-saving technologies
that decrease GHG emissions such as an EcoPower Engine Wash
which, if performed twice a year, reduces fuel bum by 1.2%."
General Electric is also exploring ways to cut emissions, primarily
focusing on cutting fuel consumption with new fans and
composite materials.3 ' Additionally, companies like Airbus are
looking into alternative fuels, while Boeing is researching
hydrogen fuel cells and the use of composite materials to lower the
weight of the aircraft and therefore lower the fuel bum,
consequently lowering emissions. 39 Finally, other manufacturers,
such as Volvo, have explored alternative fuels, lighter engines to
increase fuel efficiency, and more efficient flight routes.40 This
technology is showing some positive signs. Thus, although GHG
emissions from aircraft are growing, the industry is actually
becoming increasingly efficient. The fuel consumption per
passenger on a standard Boeing passenger plane has nearly halved
since 1960 and is lower than that of an average automobile.4'
With the emergence of new technology and operational standards,
the question remains as to what extent the EPA's authority, if any,
extends to regulate this industry.
35 Dave Demerjian, Greener Jet Engine Could Reduce Aviation's Carbon
Footprint, WIRED, June 24, 2008, http://www.wired.com/print/cars/futuretransport/news/
2008/06/ecoaviation23;
see also Press Release, Pratt & Whitney, Pratt & Whitney Announces New Geared
Turbofan Technology Partnerships (July 18, 2006), available at http://www.pw.utc.com
(follow "Media Center" hyperlink; then follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow
"Environment" hyperlink; then follow "Green Services" hyperlink).
36 Demerjian, supra note 35.
37 EcoPower Engine Wash., http://www.pw.utc.com (follow "Corporate
Citizenship" hyperlink; then follow "Environment" hyperlink; then follow "Green
Services" hyperlink).
38 Michael Mechem, GEnx Development Emphasizes Composites, Combustor
Technology, Aviation Week, April 16, 2006, available at
http://www.aviationweek.co.uk/aw/generic/storygeneric.jsp?channel=mro&id-news/aw
041706pl.xml.
39 Demerjian, supra note 35.
40 Aero Environment, A Magazine about Aviation and the Environment from
Volvo Aero, (Volvo Aero, Trollhattan, Sweden) 2007, at 22, 30, 31, available at
http://www.volvo.com (follow "Volvo Aero hyperlink; then follow "News and Media"
hyperlink; then follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Environment Issue"
hyperlink).
41 Id. at 6.
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Il. The EPA's Authority as Derived from the Text of the CAA
The CAA only authorizes the EPA to regulate aircraft engines,
not the entire aircraft. However, legislative history refers to the
engine as a complete system, meaning that all the different parts
contributing to the engine would be included in the definition, not
simply the one jet or motor engine itself.42  All previous
regulations under both Section 231 and Section 202 of the CAA1
3
have been technology based and are not analogous to the proposed
conservation measures. Of the two types of regulation, the fuel
conservation efforts appear much more controversial for the EPA
to implement under Section 231 and more prone to challenge by
industry if implemented. While the EPA has more authority
justifying the use of fuel efficiency standards implemented during
engine production than to the proposed operational standards,
some uncertainty remains regarding the applicability of
technology forcing fuel efficiency regulations.
There is no doubt that when the CAA was written, and the
subsequent major amendments were adopted, CO 2 and other
GHGs were not the driving force behind the statutes or the
regulations promulgated thereafter.44 Thus, regulation of GHGs
under the CAA has been likened to placing "new wine into old
bottles," '45 meaning that using the CAA as the vehicle for
regulation would be using a statute that was not specifically
designed to meet the needs of the different and global problem
presented by climate change.
Some experts have suggested that it may be preferable to
establish a new legislative framework that applies solely to GHGs,
because such legislation would be more effective and efficient in
addressing the problem at hand.46 However, no such statutory
regime currently exists. 47 In order to address the problem as soon
as possible, perhaps while such a regime is being crafted, it is
42 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1146 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5370
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
43 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2007). Section 202 of the CAA provides the EPA authority to
regulate emissions of pollutants from mobile sources such as motor vehicles.
44 Nordhaus, supra note 5, at 61-3 (discussing the difficulties in integrating a new
different element such as CO 2 into a pre-existing statutory regime such as the CAA).
45 Id at 53.
46 Id. at 72; see also Doran, supra note 3, at 181; but see McKinstry, supra note 3.
47 See Victor Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate
Change Legislative Proposal is "Best"?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 123 (2007)
(describing current climate change proposals).
Vol. XXXIV
INTO THE WILD GREEN YONDER
important to examine the CAA to identify what, if any, authority it
may give a proactive administration to regulate GHG emissions
from aircraft.
A. Language of Section 231 and Other CAA Statutes
Section 231 of the CAA states that "[t]he Administrator shall,
from time to time, issue proposed emission standards applicable to
the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of
aircraft engines which in his judgment causes, or contributes to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare. 48
After issuing the proposed emission standards, the EPA is
required to hold public hearings within ninety days of issuing
proposed regulations and issue the final regulations with adequate
modifications as required following the hearings.49  The
regulations should take effect "after such a period ... to permit the
development and application of the requisite technology."5 Many
of the terms in the statute are terms of art. The statute incorporates
the definition of "aircraft engine" from the Federal Aviation Act
(FAA).5 The FAA defines an "aircraft engine" as "an engine
used, or intended to be used, to propel an aircraft, including a part,
appurtenance, and accessory of the engine, except a propeller.,
52
The terms "emission standard" and "air pollutant" are broadly
defined in the CAA general definition section.53
48 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2).
49 § 7571(a)(3).
50 § 7571(a)(4).
51 § 7574.
52 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(7) (2007).
53 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (providing the following definition:
The term 'air pollutant' means any air pollution agent or combination
of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological,
radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and
byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term includes any precursors to
the formation of any air pollutant, to the extent the Administrator has
identified such precursor or precursors for the particular purpose for
which the term 'air pollutant' is used);
42 U.S.C. § 7602 (k) (providing the following definitions:
The terms 'emission limitation' and 'emission standard' mean a
requirement established by the State or the Administrator which limits
the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a
continuous basis, including any requirement relating to the operation
or maintenance of a source to assure continuous emission reduction,
2009
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B. Comparison of Section 231 to Section 202 Mobile
Source Emissions
The language of Section 231 is very similar to the language of
the CAA's Mobile Source Emissions that is relied upon to regulate
vehicle emissions in Section 202. Since Section 202 has been
utilized more, interpretations of it may be useful in examining
Section 231. Section 202 was the section at issue in
Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Court gave the EPA authority
to regulate GHG emissions from automobiles if an endangerment
finding was made; it is additionally the source for CAFE fuel
standard authority.54
It is also important to note the differences in the language
between the statutes. Section 202 is limited to regulating "new"
motor vehicles or "new" motor vehicle engines. Section 231 does
not have the restricting term "new" applied to it, leaving open the
possibility of regulating engines that are already in use. However,
it should be noted that Section 202 applies to both "motor
vehicles" and "motor vehicle engines," while Section 231 only
applies to "aircraft engines." This possibly limits the application
of the statute in contrast to broader interpretations of Section
202." Since Congress chose to distinguish "motor vehicles" from
"motor vehicle engines," both terms of art in the CAA, it could be
argued that Congress wished to distinguish emissions from
"aircraft engines" from emissions from aircrafts. This
interpretation would limit the EPA's reach, especially when
determining if the EPA could regulate operational practices of the
entire plane to reduce GHG emissions.
Additionally, Section 202 lists pollutants for which the
regulations on motor vehicle emissions must meet the "greatest
degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of
and any design, equipment, work practice or operational standard
promulgated under this chapter).
54 Mass., 549 U.S. at 529; see also Nordhaus, supra note 5, at 53-6; see also
National Solution, supra note 18. CAFE is an acronym for Corporate Average Fuel
Economy and means that the average vehicle must achieve this mandated fuel efficiency.
See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Law/Regulations/Guidance-Cafg,
available at http://www.nytsa.dot.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.43ac99aefa8569eea57
529cdba046a0/.
55 See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987) (establishing the
rule of statutory interpretation that terms that are included in parts of a statute and
omitted in others can be interpreted to have been intentionally omitted); see also
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text
for further discussion of Section 108 of the CAA and elements of statutory interpretation.
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technology."56 This type of standard does not exist in Section 231;
once again implementation of Section 231 seems much more
discretionary than Section 202. Finally, Section 202 states that the
EPA "shall by regulation prescribe ... standards."57 In contrast,
Section 231 states that the EPA must "issue proposed emission
standards" that then will undergo hearings and that the
Administrator "shall issue such regulations with such
modifications as he deems appropriate.""8 This language gives the
EPA more discretion in what type of regulations to issue, perhaps
including discretion to decide whether final regulations need to be
issued at all. Again, assuming that the EPA is seeking to regulate
GHG emissions, this final difference is not as crucial as it would
be if third parties were attempting to force the EPA to regulate as
the petitioners discussed earlier do.59
There is also an entire part present in Section 231 that is not
present in Section 202. Section 231(c) gives the President power
to disapprove of any regulation if there is a "finding by the
Secretary of Transportation that any such regulation would create
a hazard to aircraft safety."6 The only qualification is that such a
finding includes "a reasonably specific statement of the basis upon
which the finding was made."'" This again appears very broad;
"reasonably specific statements" could most likely be made to
discourage many of the operational proposals, such as carrying
less fuel. The fragmentation of administrative authority is another
obstacle for implementation by the EPA. Given the power the
statute assigns the Department of Transportation (DOT), it will be
necessary for the EPA to secure the support of the DOT in order to
adopt such standards or regulations. Such overlapping authority
and interagency cooperation may be beneficial to the system by
providing internal checks and balances on the executive and
promoting a cohesive policy;62 however, it could also be
56 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i).
57 42 U.S.C. § 7571.
58 Id.
59 See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
60 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (c).
61 Id.
62 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2326-27 (2006) (internal citations
omitted) (discussing how overlapping powers may provide necessary checks on
authority, but a President may trump both regardless:
In theory, because each department serves a different core
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burdensome and delay implementation.
It is interesting to note that the duty of regulating the actual
composition of the fuel itself falls upon the FAA.63 While the
CAA may authorize the EPA to regulate the fuel efficiency of an
engine in Section 231, neither Section 231 nor Section 211 gives
the EPA authority over the fuel itself. 4 Instead this responsibility
is given to the FAA, which must regulate fuel to correspond with
emissions regulated under Section 231:
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall prescribe -
standards for the composition or chemical or physical
properties of an aircraft fuel or fuel additive to control
or eliminate aircraft emissions the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency decides under
section 231 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7571)
endanger the public health or welfare.65
Thus, if greenhouse gases are regulated under Section 231, it
seems the FAA is required to monitor emissions by regulating the
composition of the fuel itself.
C. Importance of Section 108 - Control Measures
The existence of Section 108 of the CAA may indicate that
Congress did not intend to include operational standards limiting
how and when a vehicle or aircraft is operated as "emissions
standards" under Section 202 or 231. Section 108 instructs the
EPA to "publish and make available to appropriate Federal, state
and local environmental and transportation agencies" information
"regarding the formulation and emission reduction potential of
constituency, the overlap should produce internal checks. But
practice has deviated from theory for three reasons. First, because
agencies can be cut out of relevant decisions by political actors,
formal overlap has been made irrelevant. Second, even when
agencies have been consulted, political influence has compromised
the redundant system. Third, redundancy's benefits have collapsed as
the legal decision-maker, the Office of Legal Counsel, has been
structurally compromised. These problems illustrate that overlapping
jurisdiction creates only an architecture to enable internal checks.
Without more, that structure collapses under the weight of
presidential influence.)
63 49 U.S.C. § 44714 (2007).
64 42 U.S.C. § 7571; 42 U.S.C. § 7545. Section 211 of the CAA establishes EPA's
limited authority over the regulation of fuels.
65 49 U.S.C. § 44714.
Vol. XXXIV
INTO THE WILD GREEN YONDER
transportation control measures related to criteria pollutants and
their precursors."66 Section 108 lists several examples of what this
information should include such as: trip reduction ordinances,
traffic flow improvement programs, shared ride services, high
occupancy vehicle restrictions, and peak use restrictions.67 While
most of these listed examples pertain to emissions from motor
vehicles, the publication and provision of these types of programs
is not limited by the statute to motor vehicles. These types of fuel
saving programs for motor vehicles seem analogous to the types of
operational changes that the petitions demand for aircrafts.68
In addition, Section 108 acts as evidence that Congress was
aware of conservation-based methods of reducing emissions when
it drafted the CAA. Since they have been explicitly enumerated
here, and are not present in Sections 202 or 231, an argument
could be made that Congress did not intend for the EPA to include
such operation-based emission reduction strategies when setting
emission standards for motor vehicles or aircraft engines.
This argument is strengthened by several canons of statutory
interpretation. First, a specific statutory enumeration will trump a
general one.69 More specific to this situation is the interpretation
that "[t]he law is settled that however inclusive may be the general
language of a statute, it will not be held to apply to a matter
specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment."70
The Supreme Court has further explained this rule of statutory
interpretation stating that "where Congress includes particular
language in one section of the statute but omits it in another
section of the same act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion."'" Finally, and pertinent to Section 108 of the CAA's
effect on the authority of Section 231 to impose operational
66 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(1)(A). It is important to note that this statute, similar to
Section 202 and Section 231 of the CAA would not apply to CO2 until an endangerment
finding is made and CO 2 officially becomes a listed criteria pollutant. Id.
67 § 7408(f)(1)(A)(i)-(ix).
68 See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of operational
standards asked for in the petitions from California and Earthjustice.
69 Nguyen v. U.S.,--- F.3d .... , 2008 WL 4631719 (lth Cir.2008). "Our
construction of § 2680(a) and (h) and the proviso is in keeping with applicable canons of
statutory construction. To the extent of any overlap the more specific provision trumps
the general one." Id. at 6.
70 Doe v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 199 F.3d 146,155 (3rd Cir. 1999).
71 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447-48; see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 273.
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standards to regulate aircraft emissions, "[t]his principle has
special force when Congress has targeted specific problems with
specific solutions in the context of a general statute
particularly when the two [provisions] are interrelated and closely
positioned, both in fact being parts of the same statutory
scheme. 'M Thus, it may be advisable and more pragmatic for the
EPA to publish and make available operational standards similar
to those discussed in the petitions under Section 108, reserving the
use of Section 231 solely for the engine efficiency emission
standards.
IV. The EPA's Authority Based on the History of the CAA
A. The Legislative History of Section 231
The legislative history is limited in its discussion of aircraft
emissions, but does provide some insight to what Congress
intended when it enacted the section. The House Report states:
"Such standards would be enforced by the Administrator in the
certification and inspection of aircraft engines pursuant to his
authority under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958."7" Since the
FAA certification process occurs before an engine is certified for
operation and includes "tests and inspections" of "emissions
requirements," it is unclear how operational procedures, such as
carrying less fuel or idling less, could be enforced during the
certification process.74 An argument could be made that this
indicates these were not the types of regulations Congress
intended to authorize under Section 231. This point is bolstered
later in the House Report which states:
Such standards are to include requirements with respect
to manufacturers' warranty of such systems or devices.
Any such standards shall be prescribed only after
consultation with the Federal Aviation Administrator in
order to assure appropriate consideration for aircraft
safety. The Administrator is directed to apply such
standards in the certification and inspection of aircraft
or engines pursuant to his authority under the Federal
72 Doe, 199 F.3d at 155 (internal quotations omitted).
73 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 5359.
74 14 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2007), see also 14 C.F.R. § 21.500 (2007).
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Aviation Act of 1958.75
Once again there is mention of prior inspection to enforce
emissions regulations, and there are references to "devices" and
"systems," categories into which the operational procedures
mentioned above would most likely not fall.
The House Report also addresses whether or not the emissions
standards would be limited to just the engine or if they meant the
plane as a complete system. The report states:
Section 231 directs the Secretary to prescribe, as soon
as practicable, giving appropriate consideration to
technological feasibility and economic cost, emission
standards for any class of aircraft or aircraft engines
which cause or contribute to air pollution endangering
the health or welfare of any persons. Such standards
are to apply, whether the aircraft or engines are
designed as complete systems or whether they
incorporate other devices to prevent or control
pollution.76
This statement refers to emissions standards applicable by
"devices." However, the language referring to the standards
governing the engine or plane as a complete system may indicate
that the suggested technology-based regulations, such as more
fuel-efficient engine systems, could be viable despite the fact that
the statute only specifies aircraft engines for regulation.
Finally, the Conference Report provides insight regarding the
use of the same standard to evaluate the regulation of a pollutant
from any source. In other words, if the same reasons exist to
regulate CO 2 from a motor vehicle and to regulate CO2 from a
plane, then both need to be regulated. The report states that the
statutory regime:
Provides a uniform standard of proof for EPA
regulation of air pollutants which applies to the setting
of (1) criteria for national ambient air quality standards
under Section 108; (2) new stationary source
performance standards under Section 111; (3)
hazardous stationary source emission standards; (4)
new auto emission standards under Section 202; (5)
75 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 5370.
76 Id.
2009
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
regulations of fuels and fuel additives under Section
211; (6) aircraft emission standards under Section 231.
In all future rulemaking in these areas, the
Administrator could regulate any air pollutant from
those sources, the emissions of which in his judgment
cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."
This uniform standard will be addressed below in the section
of this article discussing case law.78
B. Section 231 Regulations and the Federal Register
Examination of the type of regulations the EPA has already
implemented for other pollutants under its authority is useful in
determining the scope of emissions regulations that may be
suitable under Section 231. Regulations have been established to
regulate aircraft emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide,
oxides of nitrogen concentrations, smoke exhaust, and fuel
venting.79 All listed aircraft pollutants are tested by an emissions
test established in the regulations that measures exhaust levels
during different engine functions.8°  The regulations have
established acceptable levels of output that must be met.
Interestingly, the emissions test in the regulations is already
designed to test emission levels of carbon dioxide, but no standard
has been set.8 There are no conservation-based operational
standards similar to those requested in the petitions applicable to
other pollutants; all of the emissions standards for aircraft engines
appear to be technology-based. These regulations are similar to
those governing emissions from motor vehicles.82
The Federal Register could also prove helpful. Here, again,
the record is limited and generally refers only to establishing the
type of emissions standards mentioned above. However, the
Federal Register record shows that there is a history of revisiting
77 H.R. Rep. No. 95-564 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1502, 1564 [hereinafter Conference Report].
78 See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying notes.
79 40 C.F.R. § 87.11; 40 C.F.R. § 87.21; 40 C.F.R. § 87.31; 40 C.F.R. § 87.60
(2007).
8o 40 C.F.R. § 87.60.
81 Id.
82 40 C.F.R. § 85.2201 to § 85.2404.
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the standards and customizing them to new environmental threats.
In particular, the regulations responded to the ozone threat with a
new standard for oxides of nitrogen in 1997, which was
subsequently amended again in 2005.3
The Federal Register history also shows a trend and desire to
conform to the international standards established by the ICAO's
Air Transport Bureau.84 Although the ICAO is well aware of the
threat of GHG emissions caused by aircraft travel, the IPCC at the
ICAO's request included this in its climate change analysis begun
in 1997, it has not established standards for carbon dioxide or
other GHG emissions from aircraft similar to those established for
other pollutants, nor does it plan to. The ICAO explains its policy
stating:
In the case of C0 2, it has been decided not to
develop an ICAO standard, since CO2 production is
directly related to fuel consumption and there is
already intense economic pressure to keep fuel
consumption to a minimum and, in addition, there
would be significant difficulties in designing a
certification condition. 85
The role of the ICAO and other international barriers, as well
as the market effect, is discussed at further length in section VI
below.
C. Deference to the Federal Aviation Administration
The FAA also plays a large role in regulating the aircraft
industry. The interplay between the FAA and the EPA in
regulating aircraft emissions could also lead to potential pitfalls if
an administration chooses to regulate GHG emissions from aircraft
under the CAA. This is especially true when examining the
operational standards proposed in the petitions. Such standards
have typically been under the control of the FAA. For example,
the FAA has contended, and the 4th Circuit has confirmed, that
they do not need to consider aircraft emissions when making
83 Control of Air Pollution from Aircraft and Aircraft Engines; Emission Standards
and Test Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 25356-01 (May 8, 1997); Control of Air Pollution
from Aircraft and Aircraft Engines; Emission Standards and Test Procedures, 70 Fed.
Reg. 69664-01 (Nov. 17, 2005).
84 62 Fed. Reg. 25356-01.
85 ICAO, supra note 19.
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decisions about criteria such as the length of runways or airport
expansion.86
Additionally, the FAA and the EPA must consult one another
when either agency approves procedures or processes inconsistent
with emissions testing procedures and in the enforcement of
emissions regulations.87 This interagency cooperation (since the
FAA is housed in the Department of Transportation) is another
hurdle that must be cleared before the EPA can implement any
program it desires to regulate GHG emissions from aircraft.
V. Case Law Determining the EPA's Authority
There is relatively little case law interpreting Section 231, but
two cases do directly address questions posed by this article.
A. National Association of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA
National Association of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA is a suit
challenging the Final Rule that established a new emission
standard for oxides of nitrogen. The challenge was based on the
fact that all of the planes already had to meet the set standard
based on the ICAO's international rules. Petitioners argued that
the EPA should not promulgate a standard that will not achieve
any actual reduction and is not "technology forcing," and thus
asserted that the regulation was not in accordance with the law. 9
The Court's analysis affords great deference to agency
interpretation of the statute. The EPA argued that in interpreting
Section 231 the agency should be given even broader than normal
discretion due to the lack of specified standards the emission
standards should satisfy.9° The dispute centered on the Final Rule
providing that: "other provisions of the CAA require the EPA to
obtain the 'greatest degree of emission reduction achievable.'
86 City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 269-274 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also
Rebecca Clarke and Wendy Davis, Hot Air: Undue Judicial Deference to Federal
Aviation Administration Expertise in Assessing the Environmental Impacts of Aviation,
69 J. AIR L. & COM. 709, 734-37 (2004). "The FAA contends that there is 'no known
cause and effect relationship between airplane emissions and human health' and
therefore the Fourth Circuit has found it reasonable for the FAA not to study these
effects further and to omit such effects from an EIS. The findings of the EPA, described
in Section I (D) above, are in direct conflict with this statement." Id. at 734 (internal
citations omitted).
87 Clarke, supra note 86, at 736.
88 National Ass'n of Clean Air Agencies v. E.P.A., 489 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
89 Id. at 1224.
90 Id. at 1226.
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Section 231, however, does not contain such language. Thus, the
Final Rule reasons, the EPA is not required to achieve a
'technology-forcing' result in the aircraft engine emissions
context."'"
The court, again giving great deference to the agency, held
that: "Congress has delegated expansive authority to EPA to enact
appropriate regulations applicable to the emission of air pollutants
from aircraft engines. Because we find that the Final Rule is not
'manifestly contrary to the statute,' it must be given controlling
weight. We therefore defer to EPA's construction of § 231 .,2
While the court does not directly approve the EPA's reasoning
that they are not required to set a "technology forcing result," they
defer to it. If a new administration directed the EPA to use a
broad interpretation of Section 231, claiming expansive authority
to regulate either fuel efficiency in aircraft engines, operational
procedures to reduce the emissions of GHGs from aircraft, or both,
this established deference in regards to Section 231 would be a
large hurdle to overcome for potential challenges by industry or
other parties to the potentially promulgated regulations. This high
level of deference and difficulty in challenging agency
interpretations of their governing statutes can be seen as an
extension of the great deference afforded agencies in interpreting
their governing statutes established in Chevron v. NRDC.93
B. Massachusetts v. EPA
In Massachusetts v. EPA, ' the Court addressed whether the
EPA has the authority to regulate GHG emissions from motor
vehicles under Section 202. Due to the similarity of the language
used in Section 202 and Section 231, and to the "uniform standard
of proof for EPA regulation of air pollutants" applying to both
statutes, this case is relevant to the questions of the extent of the
91 Id. at 1230.
92 Id.
93 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984) (Developing a two step process to determine if an agency interpretation
was 'in accordance of law' under the Administrative Procedure Act. First, the Court
would look to see if the specific question at hand had been addressed in the statute, if it
had, the Court need look no further and simply apply the statute. If the specific question
had not been addressed then the court must defer to the agency interpretation so long as
it is reasonable).
94 Mass., 549 U.S. 497.
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EPA's authority posed in this article.95 The Court, in response to
the EPA's claim that they could not regulate GHGs, stated that:
The statutory text forecloses EPA's reading. The
Clean Air Act's sweeping definition of "air
pollutant" includes "any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical,
chemical.., substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air..." §
7602(g) (emphasis added). On its face, the
definition embraces all airborne compounds of
whatever stripe, and underscores that intent through
the repeated use of the word "any." Carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are
without a doubt "physical [and] chemical . .
substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . . the
ambient air." The statute is unambiguous. 96
The court concludes stating:
In short, EPA has offered no reasoned explanation
for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases
cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was
therefore "arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not
in accordance with law." We need not and do not
reach the question whether on remand EPA must
make an endangerment finding, or whether policy
concerns can inform EPA's actions in the event that
it makes such a finding. We hold only that EPA
must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the
statute.97
While the EPA has yet to make an endangerment ruling
concerning GHGs or list GHGs as criteria pollutants, they have
taken some actions that are relevant to the petitions at hand.
In light of Massachusetts v. EPA, California renewed its
request for a waiver from the CAA so it might set emissions
standards for GHGs emitted from motor vehicles.98 The EPA
95 Conference Report, supra note 77, at 1564.
96 Mass., 549 U.S. at 500 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
97 Id. at 533 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
98 See JAMES MCCARTHY AND ROBERT MELTZ, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
CALIFORNIA'S WAIVER REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN
AIR ACT (Oct. 1 2007) available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Oct/R
L34099.pdf.
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finally ruled on the request, rejecting the waiver. In its press
release announcing the rejection of the waiver, the EPA stated that
it was unnecessary because the "EPA has determined that a unified
federal standard of 35 miles per gallon will deliver significant
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks in all
50 states."99
The EPA had originally argued in Massachusetts v. EPA that it
could not regulate fuel efficiency under Section 202 because this
authority was delegated to the Department of Transportation."'
The Court disagreed, stating that the fact "that DOT sets mileage
standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental
responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting the
public's 'health' and 'welfare,' 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1), a statutory
obligation wholly independent of DOT's mandate to promote
energy efficiency." "'
The fact that the courts have stated the EPA could regulate fuel
efficiency in the case of vehicle emissions under Section 202, and
the fact that the EPA itself has presented such action as a solution
to GHG emissions could significantly bolster the EPA's authority
to require that technology-based fuel efficiency standards be
placed on aircraft engines under Section 231. This is especially
true because Section 231 contains the same "health" and "welfare"
language relied upon by the Supreme Court. 2 On the other hand,
the issues presented by the omission of the "greatest degree of
emission reduction achievable" language from Section 231 still
exist."' Finally, the ruling that the EPA's authority to regulate
was not stripped simply because DOT set fuel efficiency standards
may be useful given the interplay between the FAA and the EPA
required to regulate emissions from aircraft."°
99 National Solution, supra note 18. The Obama administration has indicated its
intent to EPA to reexamine the California waiver request, opening the door for the
possibility that this decision will be reversed and California and the other states
following suit will be given the authority to regulate GHGs from mobile source
emissions. See Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Administrator of the EPA, State of
California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the Clean Air Act, (Jan. 26,
2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/PresidentialMemorandumEPAWaiver/.
100 Mass., 549 U.S. at 532.
1o Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
102 See 42 USC § 7571 (2007), supra note 12; see also Mass., supra note 14.
103 See discussion supra p. 113.
i04 Clarke, supra note 86, at 736; see also Katyal, supra note 62, at 2326; see
generally ANPR, supra note 16, at 80.
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As a response to the ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA
released an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking1 °5 on July
11, 2008 addressing regulating GHGs under the CAA. This filing
sheds some light on the agency's response to the ruling. However,
with the change in administration this response is of course subject
to change as well.
C. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR)
Following the ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, the only thing
standing in the way of the listing of CO2 as a criteria pollutant
under the CAA was an endangerment finding by the EPA.'0 6 The
ANPR discusses the regulation of aircraft emissions in two
sections. First, a general section addresses Section 231 and
explains its purpose. 7 Additionally, the ANPR directly addresses
the petitions discussed above and asks for comments on them to be
submitted for consideration.'
The general Section 231 discussion in the ANPR
acknowledges the broad applicability of the statute and references
the National Association case discussed previously in this
article.' O9 More importantly, and most relevant to this discussion,
is the statement following this discussion: "As with sections
202(a) and 213(a)(4), this provision authorizes, but does not
require, EPA to set technology-forcing standards to the extent
appropriate considering all the relevant factors, including noise,
safety, cost and necessary lead time for the development and
application of requisite technology."" 0
This implies that the EPA is acknowledging it is within its
right to enforce the technology-based fuel efficiency standards that
both petitions demand. This statement appears fairly definitive, in
that, if the EPA so desired, it believes it is within its authority to
set technology forcing standards.
The section of the ANPR addressing the two petitions
themselves does not provide much commentary or opinion as to
the adequacy of the petitions or the EPA's feeling of its own
105 ANPR, supra note 16.
106 Id. at 80-1.
107 Id. at 215.
108 Id. at 2-4.
io9 Id. at 215.
1o d. at 215.
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authority in this area. Instead, it simply summarizes the petitions
and asks for public comment on them. The ANPR specifically
asks for comment on the following: (1) available technology to
reduce GHGs; (2) whether the EPA has a mandatory duty to
regulate GHGs and if such regulation can be consistent with
governing international law; (3) the impact of aircraft GHG
emissions on climate change; and (4) if there should be an
endangerment finding for emissions of GHGs from aircraft.'
Thus, the EPA is arguably noncommittal in the ANPR, making no
commitment of action, yet not precluding any future action.
VI. International and Market Concerns
A. International Barriers to Domestic Regulation
The airline industry is a global industry. Any attempt to
regulate the industry domestically will affect the international
community, especially given the U.S. role in the global economy
and the large amount of international travel to and from the United
States."2 This places the regulation of GHG emissions from
aircraft in the United States in a unique position.
Both treaties and custom have significant roles in international
law and regulation." 3 There is no existing treaty governing
emissions from aircraft internationally. The Kyoto Protocol
excluded international aircraft emissions from its target. "Instead,
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Kyoto Protocol states that the
responsibility for limiting or reducing greenhouse gas emissions
from aviation bunker fuels shall fall to the Annex I Parties,
working through ICAO."'1 4
In 1944, the Convention on International Civil Aviation was
signed by fifty-two states and established the Provisional ICAO.'
The ICAO was created in April 1947 and in October 1947 became
It Id. at 317.
112 Thirty-one percent of all annual worldwide airline travel was carried out by
North American Airlines in 2007. ICAO, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNcIL, Doc #9898
(2008) available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/dcs/9898/9898_en.pdf.
113 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 237-52
(Donald Anton, Jonathan Charney, Philippe Sands, Thomas Schoenbaum & Michael
Young eds., 2007).
114 ICAO, supra note 19 (correction: quote should refer to Annex B industrialized
countries under Kyoto not Annex I).
it5 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 309,
434-435 (2000).
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a specialized agency of the United Nations. "6 The ICAO first
issued non-binding emissions regulations guidelines in 1981."7
The regulations that were in place at the time in the U.S. were
stricter than those issued by the ICAO.' 8 However, in 1982 the
United States scaled back these regulations to conform to the
ICAO regulations." 9 Since that time, the United States has used
Section 231 to adopt regulations that conform to the ICAO
recommendations as they are made. 120
The ICAO consists of nineteen members and eleven observers,
and it could be argued that the international communities'
adherence to their recommendations has become an international
custom.' 2' In this sense, the failure of the ICAO to address GHGs
in their regulation guidelines could be problematic given the
historical custom of both the United States and other nations to
conform to the ICAO standards. 2 2  However, enforcement and
"realpolitik"' 23 make this concern much more of a minor issue than
a true impediment if the United States decided to regulate GHGs
from aircraft emissions. The likely result would simply be to force
the international community to do so as well.
In fact, the international community may regulate GHG
emissions from aircraft soon on its own. Many European nations
have already begun their own regulation process. 24 An adopted
European Union directive would include aircraft emissions in
trading schemes by 2011.125 This directive allots allowances for
the emission of GHGs to aircraft operators coming to and leaving
from European Union territories based on their average 2004-2006
116 ICAO, supra note 19.
17 Reitze, supra note 115, at 434-35.
118 ICAO, supra note 19.
119 Id.
120 Reitze, supra note 115, at 435.
121 Id
122 ICAO, supra note 19.
123 "Realpolitik" is defined as "politics based on practical and material factors rather
than on theoretical or ethical objectives." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY,
realpolitik, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/realpolitik.
124 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Directive 2003/87/EC So as to Include Aviation Activities in the
Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community,
COM(2006) 818 final (Dec. 20, 2006), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0818:FIN:EN:PDF.
125 Id.
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emissions. 26  This would include domestic and international
flights, and place the burden of the requirements on aircraft
operators, allowing them to buy allowances if they exceed their
allotments. 127  This framework indicates willingness by the
international community to regulate, and may also serve as an
example for the United States to follow if legislative action is
eventually taken to establish a cap and trade scheme. 28
Another potential issue is enforcement. Since the United
States currently establishes the fuel efficiency and other regulatory
requirements at the point of production, there is no framework or
authority established for U.S. regulators, be it the EPA or the
FAA, to test foreign manufactured planes entering their
airspace. 129 In this sense it is really an issue that must be dealt
with by the local government of the manufacturer. This is yet
another reason why an international consensus is preferable in the
aviation industry. In addition, this may negate some of the United
States' "realpolitik" power to set its own standards and force the
rest of the international community to adjust to them.
Finally the ICAO is confronting the issue of GHG emissions
on fronts different from those of emission standards. Its criteria
are more similar to those authorized under Section 108 of the
CAA, which has issued guidelines for fuel conservation. 30 Fuel
burn accounts for most GHG emissions from aircraft; therefore,
reducing the amount of fuel used through these practices can
significantly reduce total GHG emissions from aircraft. 3' While
the ICAO has issued these guidelines, similar to those called for in
Section 108 of the CAA, they are merely suggestions for how an
industry may voluntarily reduce their emissions.'32 Because
customarily the EPA mirrors the ICAO, this presents another
potential impediment to the EPA making such suggestions
mandatory, or even desiring to do so. Additionally, the ICAO is
investigating alternative fuels and the potential for their use to
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See supra note 113 and accompanying text for a discussion of market based
approaches and cap and trade schemes.
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (2007); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44714 (2007).
130 ICAO, supra note 19.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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decrease the emission of GHGs from aircraft.'33 The ICAO also
acknowledges that there is an argument that formal regulation of
GHG emissions from aircraft is unnecessary or overly burdensome
on the international level because the market will take care of
introducing fuel saving practices on its own, as evidenced by
increasing fuel efficiency, and the complications of allocating
emissions on international flights may make formal regulation
increasingly difficult.'34
B. Will the Market Take Care of Fuel Efficiency?
There are two primary arguments that the types of regulations
asked for in the petitions and potentially implemented by the EPA
(if they so desired) may be wholly unnecessary. First, the airline
industry is struggling mightily to stay afloat in light of record high
fuel prices experienced in recent years. 3 ' This will make
improved fuel efficiency an absolute necessity for the industry to
survive.'36 While reducing costs and not emissions may be the
goal of airline industry behavior, investing in the very same fuel
efficient technology and adopting the operational fuel saving
measures may be forced by the market as a matter of survival.
This is a case where intent is inconsequential; the end result, a
reduction in GHG emissions, is essentially all that matters.
Second, the prevailing thought is that any sort of new federal
regulation or eventual international agreement will take the form
of a cap-and-trade based emissions trading system.' A cap-and-
trade system is described simply as a system that allows a total
maximum amount of emissions for a specific region, a "cap," and
then allows the individual regions to trade amongst themselves to
133 Int'l Civil Aviation Org, Conference on Aviation and Alternative Fuels,
http://www.icao.int/waaf2009/.
134 Statement from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to the
Twenty-Seventh Session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA) (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.icao.int/env/sb
sta-27.pdf.
135 Buckle up: Trouble Ahead for the World's Airlines, THE ECONOMIST, June 3,
2008, http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?storyjid=11484142, see
also Chris Reiter and Kyle Peterson, Trouble on the Horizon for U.S. Airlines, Reuters,
Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/AerospaceandDefense07/idUSN302715252
http0071203; see also Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu
/steo/pub/fsheets/realjprices.html.
136 Id.
137 See Obama, supra note 15; see also Kyoto, supra note 3; see generally Flatt,
supra note 47, for a description of the legislative options on the table in the U.S. that are
predominantly cap and trade oriented.
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meet the requirements.138 If one region is below its cap it can sell
its excess to a region that is above its cap. 1"9 Any market-based
cap-and-trade program would put a premium on reducing
emissions. 4 ° If an industry could obtain extremely valuable
carbon credits in such a market simply by changing its runway
practices or investing in new fuel-efficient technology, it would
certainly be in its economic best interest to do so.' 4' The ICAO
has researched the effect of such a market on the aviation industry
and has encouraged states to adopt measures to facilitate one. 42
They state:
One of the principal findings is that an emissions-
trading system that is, is a system whereby the total
amount of emissions is capped and allowances, in
the form of permits to emit C0 2, can be bought and
sold to meet emission reduction objectives. Such a
system could serve as a cost-effective measure to
limit or reduce CO2 emitted by civil aviation in the
long term, provided that it is open to all economic
sectors.
43
There appears to be an underlying belief that market forces,
whether they be in the form of an established cap-and-trade regime
or simply the airline's efforts to cut costs, may make direct
regulation of the airline industry on their emissions of GHGs
unnecessary or ineffective.
138 For a general overview of emissions trading see AN EMERGING MARKET FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: A GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING; UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME
Division of Technology, Industry and Economics (2002). The economic benefit of
allowing trading is seen through the following example: "Consider two companies, A
and B, both of which emit significant quantities of a given pollutant. Their emissions
may damage air quality, and the relevant authorities may decide that emissions should be
reduced by a given amount, say by 10 per cent. At first glance, the solution seems
simple: both A and B cut their emissions by 10 per cent. But in the real world, this may
impose very different burdens on the two companies. For example, company A may, by
the nature of its activities, be able to reduce its emissions by 10 per cent or even more at
relatively low cost. Company B, on the other hand, may find this a difficult and costly
process. It is this potential difference in reduction cost between A and B that creates a
market opportunity." Id. at 4.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Int'l Civil Aviation Org , Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly, Sept. 18-27,
2007 (Montreal, CA), http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/A36_Res22_Prov.pdf at Appendix
L.
143 ICAO, supra note 19.
2009
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
VII. Conclusion
The petitions filed requesting that the EPA regulate GHG
emissions from aircraft engines do not appear able to force the
result they desire. However, if the EPA decides to pursue the
requested provisions voluntarily, Section 231 of the CAA may
provide some authority to do so. It is unclear that the EPA would
have authority to establish fuel conservation operational standards.
Section 231 limits the EPA's authority to regulate "aircraft
engines" rather than the entire aircraft, although the legislative
history looks at the engine as a complete system. All previous
regulations under both Section 231 and Section 202 have been
technology-based and are not analogous to the operational
procedures proposed. In addition, the legislative history suggests
that Congress intended to test the emission standards during the
engine certification process, something that could not be done with
the operational standards suggested. Finally, the existence of
Section 108 may indicate that Congress intended such standards to
be implemented under the non-binding provisions of Section 108,
not made mandatory using Section 231.
Although the EPA is given great deference in interpreting the
statute, it has yet to list GHGs as criteria pollutants. There appears
to be more authority given to the EPA to regulate GHG aircraft
emissions through fuel efficiency standards established during
engine production. The Court has ruled that the EPA has this
authority in the case of motor vehicles.'" However, differences in
the language of the statutes may be at issue. The EPA has also
acknowledged that technology forcing fuel efficiency standards
are an adequate solution to the GHG emission problems presented
by motor vehicles,'45 and in the recent ANPR alluded that it has
the authority, although not the requirement, to do so with aircraft
engines. 146
Traditional technology-based approaches do not adequately
exist to properly regulate GHG emissions from aircraft. Given the
history of Section 231 and other similar provisions, it may be best
to focus Section 231 efforts on fuel efficiency and fuel burn
reduction strategies in engine and aircraft production. Fuel
44 Mass., 549 U.S. at 534.
145 See National Solution, supra note 18.
146 ANPR, supra note 16, at 215.
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conservation operational standards, which appear less
implementable under Section 231, may be best utilized as
emission reduction guidance programs under Section 108 of the
CAA. Finally, it may be the case that the market will force these
fuel reduction strategies before the courts or new regulations can.
The possibility of the U.S. entering a cap and trade GHG market
now appears highly likely; in such a market any achievable
reductions will become a valuable commodity for the struggling
airline industry.'47
DANIEL H. CONRAD
147 See Buckle Up, supra note 135; see also Reiter, supra note 135.
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